Katacomb VPN
Pick a node anywhere. Pay on-chain. Connect.
A desktop client for the Sentinel decentralized VPN network. No accounts and no single provider: you pay independent node operators directly, from a wallet you hold the keys to.
- WireGuard
- V2Ray
- XRAY
- AmneziaWG
- Hysteria2
Debian / Ubuntu
AppImage
Windows
Debian and Ubuntu
Recommended.deb package · x86_64
Debian 11+, Ubuntu 20.04+ and derivatives. Installs a small root daemon, so connecting and disconnecting never prompt for a password, and declares its dependencies properly.
Download .deb113 MBkatacomb-vpn_1.20.0_amd64.deb
Verify and install
Check it
Put
SHA256SUMSandSHA256SUMS.ascnext to the download. Import the signing key once, then check the file and the signature:gpg --fetch-keys https://keybase.io/proofoftrinity/pgp_keys.ascsha256sum -c SHA256SUMS --ignore-missinggpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc SHA256SUMSA checksum only proves the file arrived intact: anyone who can replace the download can replace the checksums with it. The signature is what makes it mean something, which is why the key's fingerprint is listed here rather than only on the release. Look for Good signature and check that the fingerprint gpg prints matches this one; its warning that the key is not certified is expected.
Signing key
740A F267 B0D8 162B E477 779D 7315 246A 6E67 F3C6Install
Install it with apt, which pulls in its dependencies:
sudo apt install ./katacomb-vpn_1.20.0_amd64.debThe install adds you to the katacomb-vpn group. Log out and back in once for it to take effect; until then, connecting asks for your password each time.
Good to know
- Wallet storage needs an OS keyring. GNOME and KDE ship one; on a bare XFCE or LXQt install, add
gnome-keyring. A missing keyring means saving a wallet is refused outright rather than silently falling back to weak encryption.
AppImage
PortablePortable · x86_64, any distro
No install step; each privileged action goes through pkexec. Needs fusermount and libgbm1, which a stock desktop already has.
Download AppImage132 MBkatacomb-vpn-1.20.0.AppImage
Verify and install
Check it
Put
SHA256SUMSandSHA256SUMS.ascnext to the download. Import the signing key once, then check the file and the signature:gpg --fetch-keys https://keybase.io/proofoftrinity/pgp_keys.ascsha256sum -c SHA256SUMS --ignore-missinggpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc SHA256SUMSA checksum only proves the file arrived intact: anyone who can replace the download can replace the checksums with it. The signature is what makes it mean something, which is why the key's fingerprint is listed here rather than only on the release. Look for Good signature and check that the fingerprint gpg prints matches this one; its warning that the key is not certified is expected.
Signing key
740A F267 B0D8 162B E477 779D 7315 246A 6E67 F3C6Install
Make it executable and run it:
chmod +x katacomb-vpn-1.20.0.AppImage./katacomb-vpn-1.20.0.AppImage
Good to know
- On Ubuntu 24.04+, prefer the .deb. With unprivileged user namespaces restricted, the AppImage starts with Chromium's sandbox disabled. The
.debinstalls the AppArmor profile that keeps it on. - Wallet storage needs an OS keyring. GNOME and KDE ship one; on a bare XFCE or LXQt install, add
gnome-keyring. A missing keyring means saving a wallet is refused outright rather than silently falling back to weak encryption.
Windows 10 and 11
BetaInstaller · x64
Installs the app and a small Windows service: one administrator prompt to install, then connecting never asks again. All five protocols. Not code-signed yet, so SmartScreen warns; verify it first.
Download for Windows114 MBkatacomb-vpn-1.20.0-setup.exe
Verify and install
Check it
In PowerShell, import the signing key once with Gpg4win's
gpg. Then print the installer's hash, compare it with its line inSHA256SUMS, and check the signature:gpg --fetch-keys https://keybase.io/proofoftrinity/pgp_keys.ascGet-FileHash .\katacomb-vpn-1.20.0-setup.exegpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc SHA256SUMSA checksum only proves the file arrived intact: anyone who can replace the download can replace the checksums with it. The signature is what makes it mean something, which is why the key's fingerprint is listed here rather than only on the release. Look for Good signature and check that the fingerprint gpg prints matches this one; its warning that the key is not certified is expected.
Signing key
740A F267 B0D8 162B E477 779D 7315 246A 6E67 F3C6Install
Run the installer and approve the administrator prompt. At the SmartScreen warning, choose More info, then Run anyway.
Good to know
- Tested on Windows 11 only. Multi-hop chains and local proxy mode have not been tried on Windows yet.
- One account. Only the account that ran the installer can connect; the service refuses the others.
Version 1.20.0, released 6 November 2026Release notesAll releases
There is no macOS or mobile build.
A look inside

Create or import a wallet, add P2P, then pick a node and connect.
What it does
Everything runs locally against the chain. There is no Trinity server in the path.
Protocols
Each node runs exactly one. The client connects to all five, on Linux and Windows, and refuses nodes advertising any other type.
| Protocol | Linux | Windows | Multi-hop | Interface | How it runs | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WireGuard | Yes | Yes | No | sntl0 | root (wg-quick) | Uses the distro wireguard-tools |
| V2Ray | Yes | Yes | Yes | sntl-tun | userspace + tun2socks | Bundled core; encrypted DNS over DoH |
| XRAY | Yes | Yes | Yes | sntl-tun | userspace + tun2socks | VLESS + Reality; bundled core |
| AmneziaWG | Yes | Yes | No | sntl0 | root (built into the helper) | WireGuard fork with DPI-evasion params |
| Hysteria2 | Yes | Yes | No | sntl-tun | userspace + tun2socks | QUIC; refuses to connect without a TLS pin |
Multi-hop chains are built on v2ray-core's proxySettings.tag, which the other protocols have no equivalent for. Bundled binaries are SHA-256 pinned; both the app and the root daemon refuse to execute one whose hash doesn't match.
Interface and How it runs are for Linux. On Windows, every protocol runs through the Katacomb VPN service, on Wintun adapters with the same names.
Security model
Node operators are treated as adversaries. Their handshake data turns into configs that wg-quick and iptables execute as root, and a single PostUp line in a WireGuard config is a root shell.
Every config is checked twice
Every node-supplied config passes an allow-list validator first, and anything not explicitly permitted is rejected. The privileged helper re-validates independently, because its socket is the real trust boundary. On Windows the same helper runs as a LocalSystem service behind a named pipe, under the same rules. The renderer runs sandboxed with context isolation and no Node access.
Paying for a session
Connecting spends real funds: a session is a blockchain transaction priced in udvpn and paid to the node operator. Preflight checks run before it is paid for, and a failure on the client side, during the handshake or validation, cancels the session and refunds it automatically. A session you actually used is not refunded. A multi-hop chain is two sessions and two deposits.
What multi-hop does not do
It protects against one dishonest node: with two hops, neither end holds both your identity and your destinations. It does not make you anonymous. Two operators working together can still correlate the circuit on traffic volume and timing, since the same bytes cross both hops at the same moments. That is a hard ceiling, not something a client can close.
The full model, including the invariants that must not regress, is in the repository. Read the security model


